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Disclaimer 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and the 
accuracy of the information presented herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of 
the U.S. Department of Transportation University Transportation Centers Program and the Florida 
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Executive Summary 
Florida’s transit systems, like those nationally, are being challenged to operate in the most cost-effective 
manner while maintaining a high level of effectiveness as budgets are tightened and demand for 
services intensifies. There has been renewed interest in contracting for fixed route service in the United 
States (U.S.). The development of a recent request for proposals for the operation of a Florida transit 
system raised several issues related to the construction of transit operating agreements. Issues surfaced 
surrounding a perceived or real tendency for U.S. agencies to be overly prescriptive in contract terms 
and conditions, which may be stifling the flexibility of private operating entities to employ creative 
means to offer more value and enhanced service to the public. 
The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) asked the National Center for Transit Research (NCTR) 
at the University of South Florida (USF) to inventory and synthesize previous work in the area of types of 
transit operating contracts in the U.S. and Europe, assess the benefits and drawbacks of each general 
approach to contracting for transit service, and develop situational guidance for FDOT to help determine 
if a particular model may be appropriately considered. FDOT also asked researchers to provide findings 
to Florida’s transit operators; however, researchers were expressly precluded from providing 
prescriptive contracting approaches for local operating decisions. 
Contracting with private service providers for the management, operation, and maintenance of transit 
services has become an acceptable business practice within the transit industry. Based on the results of 
a recent survey on the subject of contracting by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 
to Congressional Committees, Public Transit: Transit Agencies’ Use of Contracting to Provide Service, 
published in 2013 (GAO-13-782), contracting is a common way to provide transit services, with about 61 
percent of the 463 transit agencies that responded to the survey indicating they contract some or all 
operations and services. The report findings are consistent with information gleaned from a literature 
review conducted in the initial phase of the current research project. 
In the U.S., public transit agencies use contracting to procure the services of a private firm through a 
competitive bid process. The contracted service may be for a portion of the system, such as a bus route, 
or for system-wide management. The transit agency maintains ownership of the service and authority 
over setting policies, such as fares and schedules. Private contractors compete to provide transit 
services, and the agency receives the benefits of competition as prospective bidders offer their best 
possible price to win the contract. While contracting can be called privatization, in that the service is 
operated by a private provider through a contractual relationship, the U.S. system contrasts with full 
privatization efforts, such as those in the United Kingdom and Europe, where private firms own and 
operate public transit service (Wachs, Frick, and Taylor 2008). 
As acceptance of contracting public transit service has grown, the scope of the contractual 
arrangements between transit agencies and service providers has been somewhat redefined. Typical 
transit contracts include responsibility for management as well as services that incorporate operations 
and/or maintenance. Private providers recently introduced a new type of contracting, which they refer 
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to as delegated management. Delegated management contracts, which have been used in Europe for a 
number of years, expand the role of the private operator in the management and operation of the 
agency, in that all agency functions are delegated to the contractor. In Europe, delegated management 
contracts include the caveat that, under the arrangement, the contractor shares in the revenue risk. 
While labels such as management, operations, and delegated management are used to describe the 
service to be provided pursuant to the contract, the labels fall short of identifying the nature of the 
contractual arrangement between the agency and private service provider. 
Two rather extensive surveys of transit agency managers, the Transportation Research Board’s (TRB) 
Special Report 258, Contracting for Bus and Demand-Responsive Transit Services, published in 2001, and 
the GAO Report (GAO-13-782) published in 2013, provide a wealth of information concerning the 
reasons that transit agencies contract service. The most common reason for transit agencies to contract 
service was to improve operational cost-efficiency, followed by the desire to take advantage of 
resources available to private contractors that would enhance the agency’s capability to start new 
service or expand existing service. Other reasons for contracting included flexibility in how services are 
provided, the ability to minimize public employment and unionization, and politics. 
Transit agencies’ primary reason to retain service in-house was to maintain control. Some agencies 
questioned if contracting was cost-effective, particularly when the contractor was required to maintain 
accountability and service quality at a level acceptable to the agency. A number of agencies saw no 
reason to change, while others cited a lack of competition and union contracts as barriers to contracting 
service.  
Using the National Transit Database (NTD) for 2011, transit service contracting practices in five states 
were reviewed, focusing on the monetary nature of the contractual relationship between the agency 
and the contractor, to provide insight into how a contractor is paid for service. A number of the agencies 
that purchased service from multiple providers engaged in differing monetary arrangements with the 
providers. Agencies in one of the states frequently provided assistance with costs associated with fuel, 
tires, and other materials and supplies. The majority of agencies compensated the service provider 
based on a negotiated rate per unit of service delivered (fixed fee), and gave, sold, loaned, or leased 
vehicles to the seller for below market value. It was not uncommon for an agency to lease its 
maintenance facility to the seller. Use of cash reimbursement of some of the seller’s operating deficit 
was reported in several states, as was reimbursement of the seller’s entire operating deficit. Two 
contractual relationships fell outside of the common parameters. 
Specific contracts awarded by the City of Petaluma in California (Transit Services), New Orleans Regional 
Transit Authority in Louisiana (Delegated Management), Jefferson Parish in Louisiana (Management & 
Operations of Public Transportation Services), Nassau County in New York (Delegated Management), 
and Escambia County in Florida (Transit Management) were reviewed to compare and contrast 
operating parameters outlined in the contracts in terms of assignment, responsibility, and oversight.  
Overall, the contracts shared a number of similarities despite the label assigned to the contractual 
agreement. In each contract, the contractor was defined as an independent contractor. Pursuant to the 
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contracts, all agencies supplied revenue vehicles and provided facilities to the contractor for the 
contractor’s use. All contracts assigned responsibility for the condition of equipment and maintenance 
of vehicles to the contractor, and all contractors were required to provide drivers, supervisors, and 
personnel for all classifications.  
All contractors were responsible for labor negotiations, fare collection and reconciliation, and for the 
provision of safety and security. All contractors reported to the agency on a monthly basis, at a 
minimum, and were responsible for FTA/NTD reporting, ensuring compliance with a drug-free 
workplace, providing all software and hardware, providing customer information service, and managing 
customer complaints. All contractors, with the exception of one, were required to provide marketing 
and advertising. 
In terms of dissimilarities, the terms of the contracts ranged from three to five years and differed in the 
length of the renewal term and authorization for renewal. The descriptions of the contract services 
varied as well. Circumstances allowing renegotiation of the unit cost also varied from contract to 
contract. Responsibility for service plan development, fare policy, and hours of service was assigned to 
the contractor in three of the contracts; however, in cases where the contractor was responsible for 
development, final authority for approval rested with the agency. Responsibility for contract compliance 
and mandatory personnel, as identified within the contract, varied from agency to agency, as did 
requirements related to fare box recovery.  
Liquidated damages were contained in three of the contracts. In two agency contracts, liquidated 
damages were primarily operations-related, while liquidated damages in the third contract were vehicle 
maintenance-related. As an incentive, one contractor could earn up to $500 per quarter for increased 
ridership of greater than 10 percent over the average of the past two quarters. 
Performance measures contained in each of the contracts also varied between agencies, regardless of 
the nature of the agreement. Three contracts incorporated performance metrics common within the 
transit industry—on-time performance, accident frequency, and ridership growth. One contract 
required the contractor to certify quarterly on-time performance of at least 90 percent, while another 
required the contractor to submit a plan to increase ridership at least 10 percent within the first year of 
the contract. One contract included a variety of operations and maintenance metrics, such as miles 
between road calls, missed and late trips, pass sales, wheelchair boardings, drug and alcohol testing, and 
driver-related training and evaluations. Two contracts measured customer satisfaction. 
One contract identified performance metrics related to cost that included cost per mile, revenue per 
mile, and percent of miles at 100 percent recovery, and another required that the contractor seek to 
reduce the operating cost per hour by 25 percent throughout the term of the contract. One contract 
identified two technology-related performance measures that required the contractor to implement 
rider technology within three months and to establish and maintain a GIS layer for all routes, stops, 
benches, and shelters within six months. 
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A single contract required the contractor to invest in-house technical resources for development or 
financing of new or expanded rail service, invest in the agency’s infrastructure, provide services to seek 
public funding at local, state, and federal levels, and provide a national Emergency Response Team in 
the event of a natural disaster. 
At a minimum, all contractors were compensated through a fixed fee arrangement paid in monthly 
installments. A single agency reimbursed the contractor for all operating expenses incurred, in addition 
to the payment of the fixed fee for management services. Three agencies paid a variable fee based on a 
negotiated rate per platform hour, in addition to the monthly fixed fee.  
Researchers turned to individual transit agencies to explore lessons learned from their contracting 
experience. Understanding problems and successes encountered by transit agencies currently engaged 
in contracting provided valuable insight, not only for agencies considering contracting some or all service 
for the first time, but also for agencies interested in improving their existing contractual relationships 
with service providers. While most lessons learned were derived from anecdotal accounts, rather than 
from extensive study of an agency’s operating practices, they proved to be valuable by simply identifying 
problems and issues encountered in the contracting process. 
Tailoring a proposal to meet an agency’s needs eliminated difficulties that required rebidding the 
contract. Conducting a detailed cost analysis prior to awarding a new contract or extending an existing 
contract produced a level of confidence concerning the viability of a low bid and the cost-effectiveness 
of an extension. Monitoring contractor performance yielded improved customer service and ensured 
compliance with service standards. 
A number of agencies returned to public management to reduce costs, achieve direct accountability, 
and gain flexibility in service quality and cost. One agency said small contracting companies have been 
purchased by larger ones, leaving only three competitors. The resulting lack of competition led to less 
focus on the district goals and more focus on corporate goals. Another agency transitioned to in-house 
service to eliminate potential disruptions caused by external corporate reorganizations and potential 
tensions between external corporate goals and agency goals. 
Labor issues centered on compensation, work rules, agency control, and working conditions. Agencies 
can specify compensation packages to attract and retain qualified staff in their contracts, and can 
consider proposals for compensation in evaluating bids. 
A contracting decision tree is illustrated in Figure 1. The decision to contract begins with a cost analysis 
of current operations, including a route level assessment, followed by cost-efficiency strategy 
development that incorporates input from peer agencies. After considering the agency’s operating 
environment, an agency is prepared to make the contracting decision. 
If an agency elects not to contract service, several strategies may help to improve service in-house. An 
agency can work to change labor agreements related to work rules and compensation. Changes such as 
split shift, interlining, and part-time labor provide managers with more flexibility and reduce costs. 
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Adjusting vehicle routing and scheduling to reduce non-revenue service, and using efficient vehicles 
appropriately sized for low ridership routes, enhance system effectiveness and reduce costs. 
 
Figure 1 – Contracting Decision Tree 
If an agency elects to contract service, elements contracted to achieve agency goals must be identified. 
An agency can consider providing guidelines or setting minimum compensation levels for private sector 
employees, examine private contractors’ part-time employee policies and the structure of 
compensation package, develop measures to evaluate contractor performance and service quality, and 
arrange to monitor the measures. An agency can cultivate a competitive bidding environment to reduce 
the possibility of one contractor monopolizing service provision. 
Contracting for fixed route service is not a “one-size-fits-all approach” (GAO-13-782).  It may improve 
cost-efficiency for some transit agencies, which benefit from the advantages offered by access to better 
technology and reduced operational expenses. Other agencies, however, find that contracting is actually 
too costly, preferring to retain direct accountability over service quality and cost, and to avoid the 
potential complications of external corporate goals. In order to meet the challenges of today’s economy, 
transit agencies must understand and assess the benefits and drawbacks of each general approach to 
contracting for transit service. This study provides situational guidance to help transit agencies 
determine if a particular model appropriately supports the agency’s efforts to maintain quality service 
while operating in an efficient manner, and if it fits the agency’s goals and expectations. 
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Introduction 
The investigation and documentation of practices in contracting for fixed route public transportation 
service began with a review of the literature, which was delivered to Florida Department of 
Transportation as “Analysis of Transit Contracting Models and Proper Incentives for Long-Term Success, 
Task 1 – Literature Review.” Researchers focused on exploring variations in contracting not only within 
the U.S. in comparison with Europe, but also between U.S. agencies. In the U.S., the term contracting 
out is generally used when a public transit agency procures the services of a private firm through a 
competitive bid process. The contracted service may be for a portion of the system, such as a bus route, 
or system-wide. The transit agency typically maintains ownership of the service and authority over 
setting policies, such as fares and schedules. While contracting can be called, less accurately, 
privatization, the U.S. system contrasts with full privatization efforts, such as those in the United 
Kingdom, where private firms own and operate public transit service (Wachs, Frick, and Taylor 2008). 
A review of the literature was also undertaken to identify the reasons for which agencies decide to 
provide service directly and/or to contract service to a private service provider. Transportation service 
provided directly by an agency, using their employees to supply the necessary labor to operate the 
revenue vehicles, is classified as directly operated (DO); services provided to a transit agency through a 
contractual agreement are classified as purchased transportation (PT). Private contractors compete for 
service, generally through a competitive bid process, and the agency receives the benefits of 
competition as prospective bidders offer their best possible price to win the contract (Leland and 
Smirnova 2009).  
Reasons for which transit agencies decide to contract service or retain service in-house are detailed in 
the first section of the report. The most common reason that transit agencies contracted service was to 
improve operational cost-efficiency, followed by the desire to take advantage of resources available to 
private contractors that would enhance the agency’s capability to start new service or expand existing 
service. Other reasons for contracting include flexibility in how services are provided, the ability to 
minimize public employment and unionization, and politics. 
Transit agencies’ primary reason to retain service in-house was to maintain control. Some agencies 
questioned if contracting was cost-effective, particularly when the contractor was required to maintain 
accountability and service quality at a level acceptable to the agency. A number of agencies saw no 
reason to change, while others cited a lack of competition and union contracts as barriers to contracting 
service.  
Reasons that agencies decide to contract service or provide service in-house are followed by a review of 
transit service contracting practices in the states of California, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and Florida. 
The state practices were examined based on the monetary nature of the contractual relationship 
between the agency and the service provider to provide insight into how a contractor is paid for service 
rendered. Specific locations for study were identified based on established contracting practices, which 
included a new form of transit operating contract, as was the case in New Orleans, Louisiana; Savannah, 
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Georgia; and Nassau County, New York. Foothill Transit (San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys, California) was 
also included for study due to a long history of transit contractual arrangements characterized by a 
significant shift of typical agency roles and responsibilities to the service provider. A detailed review of 
the contracting practices, examination of five transit agency contracts, along with a small case study of 
the New Orleans RTA, and preliminary recommendations on contracting methods used elsewhere that 
might be appropriate for Florida, were delivered as “Analysis of Transit Contracting Models and Proper 
Incentives for Long-Term Success, Task 2 – Synthesis of Information.” 
The summary of operating contracts is followed by a detailed review of commonalities and differences 
in current transit agency contracts awarded by the City of Petaluma in California, New Orleans Regional 
Transit Authority in Louisiana, Jefferson Parish in Louisiana, Nassau County in New York, and Escambia 
County in Florida. Three represent arrangements that require the service provider to “manage, operate, 
and maintain” transit service, and two are representative of a delegated management model. Each 
contract contains provisions typically found in government procurement contracts; as a result, general 
and federal provisions common to all the contracts were excluded from the detailed comparison. The 
comparison focuses on areas that differentiate agency approaches to contracting in terms of 
assignment, responsibility, and oversight.  
Following the contract review is a summary of lessons learned from today’s transit contracting 
experiences. Brief summaries of transit agency contract-related activities provide insight to transit 
agencies, regardless of whether they provide service in-house or contract service to a private provider. 
Issues are related to the request for proposal, contract award, contractor performance, transition to 
public management, using unification to enhance cost-efficiency, and labor. 
The final section of the document outlines a recommended course of action for transit agencies 
exploring the issue of contracting service, and presents a contracting decision tree to summarize the 
process. Contract-related activities are reviewed, which include procurement, the contract document, 
term of the contract, agency provision of vehicles, compensation, and managing contract services.  
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Reasons to Contract Transit Service 
The primary reasons that transit agencies contract public transit service were developed from the 
extensive body of literature on the subject, and are listed below. Each of the reasons is discussed in 
detail. 
 Improve operational cost-efficiency 
 Start new and/or expand service 
 Allow additional flexibility 
 Minimize public employment and unionization 
 Political reasons 
 Maintain service levels 
 Access to contractor resources 
Improve Operational Cost-Efficiency 
Transit agency cost savings are derived from three primary areas. First is the difference in wages 
between the public and private sectors, where the hourly rate of pay for private employees is less than 
the public agency’s labor cost, which often includes a pension and other labor-related fringe benefit 
costs (in public transit, labor costs represent about 70% of total costs). Second, lower costs are 
generated by competition between private bidders for services along with the “threat of competition” 
to public employee unions. Finally, agencies realize cost savings by contracting for less-efficient services 
(Wachs, Frick, and Taylor 2008). Because factors such as agency size, the wage gap between bus 
operators in the public and private sectors, agency type, and the peak-to-base ratio can affect the cost-
efficiency of contracting, an agency must carefully choose the service level to contract based on an 
adequate assessment of its operating characteristics and conditions (Iseki 2010). In the recently 
published GAO Report 13-782, factors in the decision to contract varied from mode to mode. Cost 
reduction and improved efficiency were cited most frequently for fixed route service, with reducing 
costs mentioned most often by agencies that contracted all or some service. Cost savings are derived 
from lower wage rates, and contractors can provide lower rates by hiring new operators at entry-level 
wage rates, eliminating pensions and other benefits for contract workers, and minimizing the cost of 
employee health insurance by taking advantage of the large number of employees under their coverage. 
Contractors interviewed in the GAO study focused on reducing costs by increasing efficiencies through 
proprietary technology for routing and scheduling. Advanced technology is often not available to transit 
agencies outside of a contract, or is expensive for a transit agency to purchase. Another cost saving 
measure is direct provision of insurance on the vehicles the contractor uses. 
Start New and/or Expand Service 
Transit contracting has proven to be successful when implementing new specialized service that does 
not displace existing unionized workers. A frequently mentioned reason for contracting reported in the 
literature was to start new service (TRB 2001). When service needs to be established quickly, new 
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smaller agencies tend to contract all services, often based on the assumption that a private firm can 
mobilize faster than a public agency. Contracting provides an agency with the ability to assess and adjust 
the new service prior to hiring additional in-house labor, and to launch new lines, expand service, or 
establish an entire agency in the absence of in-house transit resources or expertise. Respondents to the 
GAO study reported that the decision to contract varied from mode to mode. New commuter rail, light 
rail, and heavy rail contract out service to avoid high start-up costs (new services, new vehicles, hiring 
staff, and obtaining facilities). Agencies also contract for service when they lack the capability to perform 
transit service in-house. Contracting is often used by transit agencies to try out new service with 
projected low ridership that would not be cost-effective (Iseki, Ford, and Factor 2006). 
Allow Additional Flexibility 
Agencies contract service to increase flexibility in how services are provided. Specific circumstances that 
made contracting out appealing included the ability to test new service to determine sustainability; 
adjusting the level of service based on increases or decreases in the operating budget; hiring employees 
for service adjustment; and dealing with human resources when layoffs or employee discipline occurred 
(Leland and Smirnova 2009). The GAO study reported that improved flexibility is a primary consideration 
for contracting service. Contractors can operate more efficiently by having their operators split their 
time between different jobs, and the contractor’s workforce is more flexible, with a greater number of 
part-time positions that reduce costs through decreased wages and benefits. The contractor has the 
resources of the entire company to serve as a pool for necessary staff, and flexible labor agreements 
provide the capability to cross-train staff, which enables a dispatcher to drive or a driver to perform 
dispatching functions when necessary. 
Minimize Public Employment and Unionization 
Transit service contracting can be particularly useful for new or smaller agencies. In the case of 
contracting all service, contracting may support efforts to minimize the number of new public staff to be 
added, avoid unionization of public employees, or engage in ongoing negotiations with unions (Wachs, 
Frick, and Taylor 2008). While all transit managers that use contracting interviewed in the GAO study 
said that Section 13(c) was not a deterrent to contracting, some survey respondents reported that 
challenges presented by Section 13(c) were a reason for not contracting service. 
Political Reasons 
In a 2009 survey of transit managers, some respondents cited political reasons for contracting out 
services (Leland and Smirnova 2009). Larger agencies with elected boards were much more likely to 
engage in contracting than agencies located in special purpose governments with appointed boards. 
Managers found appealing the transfer of risk from elected officials to a private entity, and the 
insulation provided by the contractor serving as a shield between elected officials and public complaints. 
Maintain Service Levels  
Contracting can be used to maintain service levels when faced with budget reductions (GAO-13-782). 
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Access to Contractor Resources 
Respondents to the GAO study noted that contracting can provide access to contractors’ expertise and 
resources. Contractors identified the expertise and resources they bring to a transit agency as a benefit 
in areas such as training and customer call centers, which allow the transit agency to focus on its 
management strengths. Contracting allows a private company to provide resources that the transit 
agency does not have. Transit agencies might receive access to expertise for technical issues and labor 
negotiations, as well as discounted purchasing rates for fuel, vehicle parts, and other equipment due to 
the large amount purchased by the contractor to cover operations for several transit agencies.   
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Reasons Not to Contract Transit Service 
Following are the primary reasons that transit agencies do not contract public transit service, assembled 
from the literature on the subject. Each of the reasons is discussed in detail. 
 Maintain control 
 Not cost-effective 
 Union contract 
 Lack of competition/too few bidders/lack of qualified firms 
 Federal Labor Rule – Section 13(c) 
 Contract length 
 Maintain accountability/service quality 
 Type of agency 
 Performance measures 
 Capital investment/agency funding 
 Safety 
Maintain Control 
Transit agencies and the literature indicate that a challenge to contracting is that it diminishes an 
agency’s direct control over operations, which, in some cases, may not provide an economic benefit 
equal to the risks associated with delegating service control to a contractor. Many agencies prefer 
in-house delivery of transit services because it provides managers with a direct line of authority to 
adjust services to meet a community’s demand or to deal with unforeseen service events. 
Not Cost-Effective 
A study published in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (Zullo 2008) found no 
immediate or long-term economic benefit from contracted bus service, and suggested that 
administrative costs with respect to contracting appear fixed rather than variable. Cost savings from 
contracting come primarily from lower driver salaries and benefits, often at the expense of transit 
service quality. When agencies try to take advantage of the wage gap through contracting, permitting 
substantially lower wages and benefits for the private-sector driver, they potentially diminish driver and 
service quality and increase driver turnover, insurance rates, and expenses for training drivers. 
Contracting may also not work when agencies fail to identify longer-term contracting costs in search of 
short-term cost reductions. “Transaction costs” associated with contracting include the cost of soliciting 
proposals and evaluating bids, negotiating contracts, monitoring contracts, and enforcing penalties for 
non-compliance. These costs must be fully considered to accurately estimate the savings (or costs) of 
contracting (Wachs, Frick, and Taylor 2008). 
Agencies that do not contract any transit service, or that contract only some aspects of their operations, 
also do so for reasons that vary by mode. For all modes except commuter rail, the top three reasons not 
to contract are that the agency desired to maintain control over operations, the agency found no reason 
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to change from the transit agency providing service, or the agency found contracting was not cost-
effective. One of the transit agencies interviewed did not contract for any service, and five contracted 
only some modes. They cited similar reasons for their decisions not to contract service. The agencies 
never considered contracting due in part to difficulty in finding a contractor willing to implement a 
costly drug and alcohol program that met FTA standards. Another reason cited was that contracting out 
maintenance services would have been more expensive than directly operating it themselves, according 
to a comparative analysis performed by the transit agency of the cost to contract versus the cost of 
in-house maintenance. One transit agency contracted service in the past and decided to bring the 
service back in-house after an analysis determined that the agency’s costs to operate the service were 
lower than the privately contracted options (GAO-13-782). 
Public agencies’ policy decisions are affected not only by economic factors, but also by political, fiscal, 
institutional, and transit-system factors. An agency whose decision makers prefer a small government 
directly providing less public service may contract service even when it is uncertain about the economic 
effects. Different sizes of agencies have different patterns of contracting; among agencies that contract, 
small agencies tend to contract out all service, while large agencies are likely to contract out only a 
portion of their service (Iseki 2010). 
Officials at two transit agencies said the contracting process is complex, long, and arduous. One agency 
indicated they start the contract solicitation process approximately one year prior to the expiration of 
the existing contract. The process includes writing the scope of work, updating requirements (which 
includes obtaining input from various departments within the agency), issuing the request for proposal, 
evaluating the responses, negotiating with the selected contractor, and monitoring any start-up 
activities. The transaction costs incurred could offset or even exceed cost savings from contracting 
transit service operation and management functions. Some studies suggest that the costs of monitoring 
the contractor’s performance may, in some cases, outweigh the benefits. The GAO study found that 
transit agencies may need to keep in-house staff to evaluate and monitor contracts, reducing efficiency 
gains and cost-related savings. 
Union Contract 
Contracting may not work when well-utilized, regular, in-house bus service is transferred to the private 
sector, particularly if that service is already efficiently delivered by public-sector employees. Labor 
groups will likely oppose such conversion because these services are traditionally their members’ core 
employment and livelihood. In this scenario, it may be more advantageous for an agency to negotiate 
changes to work rules to maximize vehicle and driver utilization and reduce costs (Wachs, Frick, and 
Taylor 2008). Larger, older agencies are more likely to contract out only a portion of service because 
they have long histories of public provision of services by unionized public employees, and political 
battles would likely ensue if the system moved toward contracting with private companies. 
 
Even when contracting is likely to reduce costs and improve cost-efficiency, an agency may choose not 
to contract because concessions granted to unions in the negotiation process could make overall service 
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much more expensive. Furthermore, elected officials on the board could favor in-house service for 
perceived political support. 
Transit agencies that are unionized must consider how organized labor would react to a contracting 
decision (Iseki, Ford, and Factor 2006). While a union may concede to contracting out new services, it 
tends to show much stronger opposition to contracting out existing services, which threatens union 
members’ current jobs. However, according to one study, while most agencies with some in-house 
service are sensitive to union resistance to contracting, they may also face financial distress and be 
forced to find ways to increase cost-efficiency. Maintaining a good relationship and open 
communication with the union enables both parties to work together to increase cost-efficiency of 
in-house service, while avoiding significant job losses due to contracting. Even when transit managers 
are aware of other strategies for increasing cost-efficiency, they need cooperation and concessions from 
the union to implement them (GAO-13-782). 
Lack of Competition/Too Few Bidders/Lack of Qualified Firms 
Contracting may not work when there is an inadequate number of potential qualified private 
contractors to bid on service contracts, particularly if part of the purpose of contracting is to generate 
competition among bidders. Unequal competition in the bidding process with a few dominant vendors 
can erode competition in the bidding process that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
contracting (Wachs, Frick, and Taylor 2008).  
Federal Labor Rule – Section 13(c) 
Some GAO survey respondents reported the challenges presented by Section 13(c) as a reason for not 
contracting out service. 
Contract Length 
The long term length of existing contracts, 5.5 years on average, and the unequal competition in the 
bidding process (a few dominant vendors), likely erode the competition in the bidding process that 
would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of contracting out with a private vendor for services 
(Leland and Smirnova 2009). 
Maintain Accountability/Service Quality 
In the Transportation Research Board’s (TRB) Special Report 258, Contracting for Bus and Demand-
Responsive Transit Services, the most common survey response for not contracting was an agency’s 
desire to maintain accountability and service quality. The capacity to manage the contract can be 
impacted by questionable ethics used by vendors in the bidding process. Highly aggressive and 
questionable tactics used to entice employees from one contractor to another, interfering with what 
should be an independent decision-making process, submitting intentionally low bids, and deferred 
maintenance can negatively influence the contract management process (Leland and Smirnova 2009). 
Inadequate oversight could actually reduce efficiency in contracted service (Iseki 2010). 
  
  
9 
Type of Agency 
The type of agency may moderate the effect of contracting on cost-efficiency. Different agencies are 
subject to different institutional and political conditions that may influence how contracting affects cost-
efficiency (Iseki 2010). 
Performance Measures 
Contracts that fail to relate performance measures to a contractor’s profits present a challenge to 
contracting. Historically, agencies have gone above and beyond to ensure high-quality service. Because 
contractors are profit driven, they may not be motivated to provide the same level and quality of service 
as the transit agencies (Iseki 2010). 
Capital Investment/Agency Funding 
Three of the six contractors interviewed in the GAO survey said that the capital investment required for 
a contract might prevent them from bidding. One contractor identified transit agency funding as the 
biggest barrier to contracting, when agencies are driven into a contracting arrangement based on price 
rather than value because of funding constraints. 
Safety 
A major concern about contracting expressed by national and local union officials interviewed in the 
GAO study was that contracting might lead to a decreased level of safety, poor service quality, and 
hidden costs, when contracted employees receive less training than transit agency employees. 
Nonetheless, officials at all of the nine agencies that use contractors reported that they oversee 
contractor performance through various activities, including inspecting contractor facilities or vehicles, 
and none of the officials interviewed raised concerns about safety. One transit agency said that officials 
inspect the contractors’ buses on a daily basis to determine their condition and whether preventive 
maintenance or repairs have been performed. The agency also reviews performance data related to 
customer complaints, on-time performance, accidents, and maintenance, which it compiles in a monthly 
report.   
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Operating Contracts Executed in Identified Areas 
Transit agencies are required to report a variety of service metrics along with operating and financial 
information to the NTD. Within the NTD, transit service is designated by type of service, which includes 
service directly operated by the agency and service purchased by the agency from a private provider or 
another transit agency. Since NTD reporting requirements apply specifically to transit agencies 
regardless of organization type, rather than to private service providers or contractors, transit agencies 
are responsible for reporting information and metrics for both DO and PT service. Agencies that 
purchase services are required not only to describe the contractual relationship between the reporting 
agency and the service provider, but also to identify the company or transit agency that provides the 
service to avoid duplicative reporting (NTD Form B-30). In addition, reporting agencies are required to 
detail the monetary nature of the contractual relationship using the following descriptors: 
 Negotiated rate per unit of service delivered (e.g., cost per revenue hour) 
 Cash reimbursement of some of seller’s operating deficit 
 Cash reimbursement of all of seller’s deficit 
 Cash reimbursement to seller of reduced fare programs 
 Vehicles given, sold, loaned, or leased for below market value to the seller 
 Maintenance facility leased to seller 
 Cash payment to seller for specific mass transportation services 
 Other 
 
Using the 2011 NTD (most recent version available), researchers examined the nature of contracting for 
rail and fixed route bus service reported by all transit agencies operating in California (CA), Georgia (GA), 
Louisiana (LA), and New York (NY). Researchers also reviewed transit agencies operating in Florida (FL) 
to identify the characteristics of contracting practices currently in place statewide. 
An agency in each of the states included in the review operated at least a single rail system. Agencies in 
New York directly operated their rail service, as did the single agency operating rail service in Georgia. 
The single rail agency operating in Louisiana purchased all rail service. In California, 41.7 percent of 
agencies purchased all or some rail service from four service providers, using a combination of a 
negotiated rate per unit of service and cash reimbursement of the seller’s deficit. In Florida, one of four 
agencies (25.0%) purchased rail service from a single provider, based on a negotiated rate per unit of 
service. 
California, Louisiana, and Florida agencies provided vehicles to their contractors. California agencies 
assisted two contractors with the costs of fuel and other supplies. 
Under Louisiana’s delegated management contract, the agency defined the monetary nature of its 
contractual relationship as other. 
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Overall, 57.1 percent of the agencies that purchased all or some rail service compensated the contractor 
based on a negotiated rate per unit of service delivered. 
Details of the contractual arrangements for rail services are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Monetary Nature of Contractual Relationship – Rail 
Rail Service CA GA LA NY FL 
Agencies 12 1 1 5 4 
Purchased all or some service 5 0 1 0 1 
% purchased all or some service 41.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 25.0% 
Directly operated all service 7 1 0 5 3 
% directly operated all service 58.3% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 75.0% 
Number of service providers 4 0 1 0 1 
Negotiated rate per unit of service delivered 3 0 0 0 1 
Cash reimbursement of all of seller’s deficit 2 0 0 0 0 
Fixed fee + variable fee 0 0 1 0 0 
Agency provided vehicles 5 0 1 0 1 
Paid or assisted with costs of fuel/other supplies 2 0 0 0 0 
 
Agencies within each of the states included in the review purchased all or some fixed route bus service. 
In California, 73.8 percent of the agencies purchased all bus service from 29 service providers, using 
primarily a negotiated rate per unit of service. 
Agencies in each state provided vehicles to their contractors. Agencies in California, Georgia, and New 
York also assisted some of their contractors with the costs of fuel and other supplies. 
Agencies in Georgia and Florida purchased service from a sister agency. California, Georgia, and Florida 
agencies negotiated different monetary arrangements with service providers. 
Under a delegated management contract, a Louisiana agency compensated the contractor with a fixed 
fee payment in addition to a variable fee payment based on a negotiated rate per platform hour. 
Overall, 77.8 percent of the agencies that purchased all or some fixed route bus service compensated 
the contractor based on a negotiated rate per unit of service delivered. 
Details of the contractual arrangements for fixed route bus services are presented in the following table 
(Table 2). 
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Table 2 – Monetary Nature of Contractual Relationship – Bus 
Fixed Route Bus Service CA GA LA NY FL 
Agencies 80 15 9 36 30 
Purchased all or some service 59 5 3 11 12 
% purchased all or some service 73.8% 33.3% 33.3% 30.6% 40.0% 
Directly operated all service 21 10 6 25 18 
% directly operated all service 26.3% 66.7% 66.7% 69.4% 60.0% 
Purchased service from sister agency 0 3 0 0 3 
Contracted with multiple providers 14 1 0 2 3 
Different monetary arrangements with providers 9 1 0 0 1 
Number of service providers 29 4 2 17 14 
Negotiated rate per unit of service delivered 47 5 1 9 8 
% negotiated rate per unit of service delivered 79.7% 100.0% 33.3% 81.8% 66.7% 
Cash reimbursement of all of seller’s deficit 3 1 0 0 0 
Cash reimbursement of some of seller’s deficit 6 0 1 0 3 
Fixed fee + variable fee 0 0 1 0 0 
Agency provided vehicles 41 4 1 8 8 
Agency leased maintenance facility 4 0 1 0 1 
Paid or assisted with costs of fuel/other supplies 11 1 0 1 0 
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Review of Five Transit Agency Contracts 
Contracting methods were explored through an examination of select transit agency contracts with 
private service providers. Researchers reviewed the following transit contracts to identify the nature of 
the contractual relationships. 
1. Transit Services Agreement awarded on January 1, 2007, by the City of Petaluma, California, to 
MV Transportation, Inc. (City of Petaluma)  
2. Management Agreement awarded on October 3, 2008, and amended to transition to a 
Delegated Management Contract on September 1, 2009, by the New Orleans Regional Transit 
Authority, Louisiana, to Veolia Transportation Services, Inc. (New Orleans) 
3. Management and Operations of Public Transportation Services Agreement awarded on 
September 15, 2011, by the Parish of Jefferson, Louisiana, to Veolia Transportation Services, Inc. 
(Jefferson Parish)  
4. Delegated Management Agreement awarded on January 1, 2012, by Nassau County, New York, 
to Veolia Transportation Services, Inc. (Nassau County) 
5. Transit Management Agreement awarded on April 1, 2012, by Escambia County, Florida, to First 
Transit, Inc. (Escambia County) 
Despite the nomenclature used to identify each of the contracts, the operating practices outlined in the 
contracts, as illustrated below, are quite similar. Details are presented in Appendix A. 
Contract Similarities 
In each case, the contractor is defined as an independent contractor. All agencies supply revenue 
vehicles to the contractor for the contractor’s use, after a joint inspection, and provide facilities to the 
contractor for the contractor’s use. 
All contractors are responsible for the condition of equipment and maintenance of vehicles. Contractors 
are required to provide drivers, supervisors, and personnel for all classifications. Escambia County 
includes an employment preference for local labor. 
All contractors are responsible for labor negotiations. Escambia County requires that the contractor 
notify the County of any changes in the union employee wage rate. 
All contractors are responsible for fare collection and reconciliation. The City of Petaluma requires the 
contractor to submit reports to the City each month that include daily fare collection. Nassau County 
also provides the contractor with specific reporting requirements. 
All contractors are required to provide safety and security. The City of Petaluma issues specific 
requirements to the contractor and requires the contractor to develop and distribute an Illness & Injury 
Prevention Plan. Jefferson Parish also issues specific requirements to the contractor, and requires the 
contractor to submit a plan to increase overall traffic at a transit terminal to improve transit safety and 
security.  
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All contractors are responsible for regular monthly reporting. The City of Petaluma issues specific 
requirements for daily, weekly, and monthly reports. New Orleans requires the contractor to include 
system expenditures, financial records, and operating records in monthly reports. Jefferson Parish issues 
specific requirements for monthly reports. Nassau County requires the contractor to submit 
Performance Measures and a Performance Scorecard. Escambia County requires annual reporting 
requirements. 
All contractors are responsible for FTA/NTD reporting, ensuring compliance with Drug-Free Workplace 
requirements, the provision of all software and hardware, providing customer information service, and 
managing customer complaints. The City of Petaluma requires that the contractor respond to 
complaints, maintain a log, and report to the City as specified in the agreement. Escambia County 
requires the contractor to maintain a Complaint Tracking Database. 
All contractors, with the exception of the City of Petaluma, are required to provide marketing and 
advertising. 
Differences in Contracts 
The terms of the contracts range from three years for the City of Petaluma and Jefferson Parish to five 
years for New Orleans, Nassau County, and Escambia County. 
There is variation in contract renewals/extensions, as detailed below: 
 Jefferson Parish – no reference to renewal or extension 
 City of Petaluma – two-year option upon mutual consent of the parties, subject to the city 
council’s approval 
 Escambia County – two-year extension upon mutual consent of the parties 
 New Orleans – option to renew automatically upon (1) contractor meeting performance 
criteria, and (2) contractor’s significant investment in the transit system, or by mutual consent 
 Nassau County – five-year renewal at County’s discretion 
There is also variation in the following descriptions of the contract services: 
 City of Petaluma – fixed route operations, administrative, and maintenance-related functions 
 New Orleans – manage all transit system functional responsibilities, operations, and 
maintenance 
 Jefferson Parish – manage and operate 
 Nassau County – manage and operate 
 Escambia County – manage, operate, and maintain 
New Orleans designates the contractor as the party responsible for non-revenue vehicles, and Nassau 
County restricts the cost to maintain non-revenue vehicles during the first year of the contract to 
$20,000. The other agencies do not address non-revenue vehicles. 
Adjustment in the unit cost varied across the contracts, as illustrated below: 
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 City of Petaluma – renegotiate if revenue hours <90% or >110%; restricts an annual increase to 
3% based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the Management Services Agreement (MSA) 
 New Orleans – agency and contractor negotiate fixed fee (adjusted annually) and variable fee 
(based on platform hour rate), pursuant to annual plan and budget 
 Jefferson Parish – renegotiate rate if revenue hours increase or decrease by more than 10% 
 Nassau County – agency and contractor negotiate fixed fee (adjusted annually) and variable fee 
(based on platform hour rate), pursuant to annual plan and budget 
 Escambia County – contractor may recommend rate adjustment to cover increases or decreases 
in cost structure; contractor may submit proposal for increase in the case of extraordinary 
events 
The City of Petaluma and Jefferson Parish provide the service plan, and reserve the right to adjust the 
service plan to meet the agency’s needs. New Orleans, Nassau County, and Escambia County require the 
contractor to provide the service plan. New Orleans’ service plan is subject to agency approval. Nassau 
County’s service plan is subject to Transit Committee approval. Escambia County reserves the right to 
adjust the service plan in writing. 
The City of Petaluma and Jefferson Parish provide the fare policy and hours of service. The City of 
Petaluma reserves the right to adjust the fare policy and hours of service at the City’s sole discretion. 
Jefferson Parish reserves the right to adjust the fare policy and hours of service to meet the agency’s 
needs. New Orleans, Nassau County, and Escambia County require the contractor to provide the fare 
policy and hours of service. New Orleans’ fare policy and service hours are subject to agency approval. 
Nassau County’s fare policy and service hours are subject to Transit Committee approval. Escambia 
County reserves the right to adjust the fare policy and service hours in writing. 
Responsibility for contract compliance rests with the City of Petaluma project manager, New Orleans 
Authority Board, Jefferson Parish Department of Transit Administration, Nassau County, and the 
Escambia County administrator or designated representative. 
The City of Petaluma, New Orleans, and Jefferson Parish provide fuel to the contractor. The contractor is 
required to provide fuel in Nassau County and Escambia County. 
Personnel mandated within the contracts varied, as illustrated below: 
 City of Petaluma – project manager, mechanic, half-time road supervisor, and general manager 
 New Orleans – chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief operating officer, chief 
maintenance officer, marketing director, human resources director, director 
scheduling/planning, director of procurement, executive consulting personnel, and technical 
assistance 
 Jefferson Parish – project manager, maintenance manager, agency issues specific requirements 
 Nassau County – chief executive officer and chief operating officer 
 Escambia County – general manager, subject to County approval 
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 Fare box recovery within the contracts varied, as follows: 
 City of Petaluma – contractor must satisfy Transportation Development Act requirement that 
15% of monthly operating cost be obtained from the fare box revenue for fixed route; any 
shortfall in the 15% must be paid by the contractor at the end of the year 
 New Orleans – no liability for revenue shortages 
 Jefferson Parish – agency requires 100% collection from the fare box 
 Nassau County – beginning with the second budget year, if fare box revenue falls short of annual 
or exceeds projected revenue, contractor is responsible for or receives surplus or shortfall up to 
5% of annual projected fare box revenue; contractor may renegotiate financial terms if shortfall 
is >10% for two quarters 
 Escambia County – contractor is responsible for fare box recovery 
Escambia County is responsible for payment of all operating expenses, but the contractor must retain 
necessary working capital equal to fund at least 60 days of operating expenses; Escambia County will 
pay on a cash reimbursement basis. 
The City of Petaluma contractor may earn an incentive of up to $500 per quarter for increased ridership 
of >10% over the average of the past two quarters. 
Liquidated Damages 
No liquidated damages were identified for New Orleans or Escambia County. Liquidated damages 
detailed for the City of Petaluma, Jefferson Parish, and Nassau County are provided below in Table 3. 
Table 3 – Liquidated Damages 
City of Petaluma Jefferson Parish Nassau County 
Contractor charged each time 
default occurs: 
▪ $100 per non-trainee driver’s 
failure to wear an approved 
uniform while on duty 
▪ $50 per trip for driver’s failure to 
announce major intersections, 
transfer opportunities, and 
major activities as required by 
the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) 
▪ $50 per missed trip that was in 
contractor’s control 
▪ Maximum liquidated damages in 
any month must not exceed 
$1,000 
 
▪ $100 per day will begin to accrue 
and payable on the 16
th
 day of 
each month until the manager 
receives monthly reports 
▪ $100 per day per vehicle 
assessed against monthly invoice 
for vehicles reported as dirty for 
two consecutive days 
▪ $100 per day for inoperable air 
conditioning and heating longer 
than the same day of breakdown 
▪ $100 per day for operating 
vehicles that have failed the 
safety inspection 
▪ $5,000 for each event of false or 
misleading information given to 
the agency for any instance as 
delineated in the agreement 
▪ Contractor must pay $5,000 for 5 
percentage points worse than 
benchmark for on-time 
performance 
▪ Contractor must pay $2,000 for 5 
percentage points worse than 
benchmark for percentage of 
missed pullouts 
▪ Contractor must pay $5,000 for 
10% worse than the benchmark 
for accidents per 100,000 miles 
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Performance Measures 
Performance measures contained in each of the contracts are presented in Table 4. The City of 
Petaluma, Nassau County, and New Orleans incorporated performance metrics common within the 
transit industry—on-time performance, accident frequency, and ridership growth. Escambia County 
required the contractor to certify quarterly on-time performance of at least 90 percent, and Jefferson 
Parish required the contractor to submit a plan to increase ridership at least 10 percent within the first 
year of the contract. 
Table 4 – Transit Agency Performance Measures 
City of Petaluma Transit 
Services Agreement 
New Orleans RTA 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Jefferson Parish 
Management & 
Operations of Public 
Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Nassau County 
Delegated 
Management 
Agreement 
Escambia County 
Transit 
Management 
Agreement 
Reported monthly by 
contractor: 
▪ Miles between road 
calls 
▪ Miles between 
maintenance road calls 
▪ # and % of missed/late 
pull-outs 
▪ # and % of missed/late 
trips 
▪ # and % of on-time 
performance  
▪ # of complaints/1,000 
passengers 
▪ Total accidents/ 
100,000 miles 
▪ Collision accidents/ 
100,000 miles 
▪ Ridership by day, 
mode, route, and fare 
type 
▪ Total preventable 
accidents/100,000 
miles 
▪ Passenger accidents 
per 100,000 miles 
▪ Pass sales activity at 
dispatch office 
▪ Wheelchair boardings 
▪ Drug & alcohol tests 
▪ Driver/dispatcher 
training activities 
▪ Driver evaluations 
▪ Request for service not 
currently provided 
▪ Invest in in-house 
technical resources for 
development/ 
financing of creation/ 
expansion of rail 
systems 
▪ Strive to improve 
operating performance 
for safety (current 
preventable traffic 
accident frequency: 
bus 2.0, streetcar 5.06)  
▪ On-time service 
(current: bus 88%, 
streetcar 85%) 
▪ Passenger growth 
(current: bus 19 per 
hour, streetcar 37 per 
hour) 
▪ Invest in agency’s 
infrastructure 
▪ Provide services to 
seek public funding at 
local, state, and 
federal levels 
▪ Provide a national 
Emergency Response 
Team in the event of a 
natural disaster 
▪ Seek to reduce $151.17 
operating cost per 
hour by 25% 
throughout contract 
term (adjusted for 
inflation) 
▪ Contractor must 
submit 
implementation 
plan to increase 
ridership at least 
10% within first 
year of agreement 
Performance 
Scorecard: 
▪ Revenue hours 
▪ Service miles 
operated 
▪ Cost per mile 
▪ Revenue per mile 
▪ Cost recovery 
▪ % of miles @ 100% 
recovery 
▪ Calls answered 
ratio 
▪ Pass-ups 
▪ On-time % 
▪ Customer 
satisfaction score 
▪ Net promoter 
score 
▪ Missed trips  
▪ Mechanical 
breakdowns per 
week 
▪ Accidents per 
100,000 miles 
▪ Bus cleanliness*  
▪ Stop cleanliness* 
▪ On-time 
perception* 
 
* These measures 
were listed as 
tentative and 
subject to 
modification or 
replacement 
▪ Contractor must 
certify quarterly 
on-time 
performance of 
at least 90%  
▪ Implement Rider 
Technology 
within three 
months 
▪ Establish and 
maintain a 
Geographic 
Information 
System (GIS) 
layer for all 
routes, stops, 
benches, and 
shelters within 
six months 
▪ Implement 
Escambia County 
Transit 
Development 
Plan (TDP) within 
six months 
▪ Contractor will 
periodically 
propose 
alternatives for 
poor performing 
routes, subject to 
County approval 
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The City of Petaluma incorporated a variety of operations and maintenance metrics, including miles 
between road calls, missed and late trips, pass sales, wheelchair boardings, drug and alcohol testing, and 
driver-related training and evaluations. Both the City of Petaluma and Nassau County measured 
customer satisfaction. 
Nassau County identified various performance metrics related to cost that included cost per mile, 
revenue per mile, and percent of miles at 100 percent recovery, and New Orleans required the 
contractor to seek to reduce the $151.17 operating cost per hour by 25 percent throughout the 
contract term. 
Escambia County identified two technology-related performance measures that required the contractor 
to implement rider technology within three months, and to establish and maintain a GIS layer for all 
routes, stops, benches, and shelters within six months. 
New Orleans appears to be the only agency that required the contractor to invest in in-house technical 
resources for development or financing of new or expanded rail service, invest in the agency’s 
infrastructure, provide services to seek public funding at local, state, and federal levels, and provide a 
national Emergency Response Team in the event of a natural disaster. 
Payment Schedule 
At a minimum, all contractors were compensated through a fixed fee arrangement paid in monthly 
installments, as illustrated in Table 5. Escambia County was the only agency that reimbursed the 
contractor for all operating expenses incurred, in addition to the payment of the fixed fee for 
management services. 
The City of Petaluma, New Orleans, and Nassau County paid a variable fee based on a negotiated rate 
per platform hour, in addition to the monthly fixed fee.  
Table 5 – Transit Contract Payment Schedules 
Method 
of 
Payment 
City of 
Petaluma 
Transit Services 
Agreement 
New Orleans 
RTA Delegated 
Management 
Agreement 
Jefferson Parish 
Management & 
Operations of Public 
Transportation Services 
Agreement 
Nassau County 
Delegated 
Management 
Agreement 
Escambia County 
Transit 
Management 
Agreement 
Fixed fee 
(monthly) 
$23,801 $1,390,732* $823,888 $2,319,664 $32,750 – $34,754 
Variable 
fee 
$22.82 per 
gate-to-gate 
hour 
$76.86 per 
fixed route 
platform hour 
 
$87.12 per 
fixed route 
platform hour 
 
Operating 
expenses 
Contractor pays 
all operating 
expenses 
Contractor pays 
all operating 
expenses 
Contractor pays all 
operating expenses 
Contractor pays 
all operating 
expenses 
County reimburses 
all authorized 
operating 
expenses 
*Includes fixed route, streetcar rail, and paratransit service. 
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Lessons Learned from Transit Contracting Experience 
Researchers turned to individual transit agencies to explore lessons learned from their contracting 
experience. Understanding problems and successes encountered by transit agencies currently engaged 
in contracting provides valuable insight, not only for agencies that are considering contracting some or 
all service for the first time, but also for agencies interested in improving their existing contractual 
relationships with service providers. While most lessons learned are derived from anecdotal accounts, 
rather than from extensive study of an agency’s operating practices, they prove to be valuable, at a 
minimum, by simply identifying problems and issues encountered in the contracting process. 
Request for Proposal 
Tailor Request for Proposal to Meet Service Needs 
In May 2011, a transit agency awarded a transit service contract to a new contractor, which was the low 
bidder and $50 million less than the current contractor, which had been the service provider for the past 
20 years. Following a protest on the part of the current provider, the agency rescinded the contract with 
the low bidder. The low bidder sued the agency, and FTA intervened due to concerns about the use of 
federal funds. Subsequently, the agency and the low bidder reached an agreement that called for the 
contract bidding process to begin again, but with the bus system split in two. The agency awarded two 
new bus operator contracts in February 2013. Neither the original contractor nor the low bidder in the 
first bid process was successful in the competition. 
Contract Award 
Conduct Cost Analysis Prior to Award to Ensure Fiscally Responsible Bid  
A contractor had been losing money under the current three-year contract that would have expired in 
June 2014. In January 2013, the agency addressed the contractor’s losses by covering half of the 
contractor’s deficit with an $18,000 payment, with the contractor assuming internally the other 50 
percent deficit. The agency informed the contractor that there should be no more fiscal issues regarding 
the agreement for the remainder of the contract term. In February 2013, the union threatened to strike 
if contract negotiations for a new union contract fell through. The contractor’s bus drivers were paid an 
average of $11.43 an hour, while the state average was $18.73 an hour; the strike was averted after 
“negotiations ended amicably.” The agency decided to issue a request for proposal (RFP) beginning in 
January 2014 instead of using the option years in the contract with the contractor, because the transit 
director believed the current contract “may not be profitable.” The agency used “emergency 
procurement rules,” and interested companies had 15 days to submit proposals. Three companies 
submitted proposals. In June 2013, a year before expiration of the existing contract, the agency and the 
contractor mutually ended their contract, and the agency awarded a one-year transit operations and 
maintenance agreement that ends in June 2014 to a new contractor. At the end of the new one-year 
contract, the agency will request bids for a five-year contract. Bid evaluation criteria included experience 
of senior staff; the ability to provide high-quality service at a competitive price; and retention of existing 
employees at the same or better wages. The board said the new contract had been “significantly 
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changed” to make it more “fiscally sustainable” and either side could increase or decrease the price by 
10 percent without changing the contract. The contract left no room for “we’re underpriced because of 
economic circumstances.” If it came to that, then service levels would be adjusted accordingly.  
Conduct Cost Analysis Prior to Extension/Renewal to Ensure Effectiveness 
In August 2007, prior to the expiration of a current contract term, a transit agency agreed to increase 
the current contractor’s management fees by a collective $7 million on its two contracts without a 
competitive proposal. FTA requires the completion of a detailed cost analysis for renewal or extension of 
a bus contract, which the agency did; however, the results of the analysis (which included a comparison 
with three properties, all operated by the current contractor) were not available when the city council 
approved the contract. 
Contract Awarded for Factors Other Than Cost 
A transit agency committee evaluated four companies bidding to provide bus service, using the 
following criteria: experience, thoroughness of the proposed management plan and other plans, and 
solutions for maximizing service and cost-efficiency. Staff recommended the five-year contract go to a 
new contractor rather than to the current firm (low bidder). In March 2013, the board awarded the 
contract to the new contractor, which will take over bus operations in July under a contract that will cost 
$7.5 million more over seven years than the current contractor’s bid, mainly due to employee costs. A 
staff report said that the current contractor’s long-term fiscal projections seemed artificially low, given 
anticipated future expenses. The new contractor will administer an employee bonus fund to provide 
performance-based rewards and incentives, and an employee wellness fund to develop health and 
fitness programs. 
Conduct Cost Analysis Prior to Award for Long-Term Budgetary Sufficiency 
When a transit agency partnered with a contractor in July 2010, a board member stated that the 
relationship would open new funding opportunities and improve efficiency. About three years into the 
five-year delegated management contract, the authority board voted to end the partnership and gave 
the contractor 45 days to transfer management back to the authority. The board chairman concluded 
that the private operator was becoming too expensive (5% of operating budget). The return to self-
management included a significant shift of human resources since drivers, mechanics, and other 
workers had become employees of the contractor after the agreement. The labor agreement had to be 
revised, and some details regarding the transfer of pension plans had to be resolved. 
Ensure Contract Provisions Are Enforceable 
When a current contractor first bid on an agency bus contract, it allegedly objected to all fines the 
agency planned to assess for performance. Transit agency officials told the contractor that unless it 
withdrew the objections, the contractor could not bid on the contract. Company officials withdrew their 
objections. A new five-year management and operations contract was awarded to the current 
contractor in June 2010, with a start date in July 2010. 
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Ensure Contract Provisions Are Enforceable and Contract Oversight Delineated 
A transit agency had established standards that covered such things as regulations for fuel in vehicles, 
bus cleanliness, unauthorized stops, and on-time performance. From July 2008 through August 2010, 
the agency levied more than $160,000 in assessments covering nearly 300 violations. There were 
allegations that the contractor attempted to resolve the issue of the fines in direct meetings with the 
city council rather than with transit staff, as delineated in the contract. A 2010 audit by the commission 
that oversaw transit funding in the service area found that bus service performance “exhibited mostly 
negative trends in all areas” related to efficiency and productivity. The transit agency hired a consultant 
to compare the dynamics of bus operations with other contracts; the agency apparently employed fines 
more aggressively than all but one of the four agencies reviewed. An agency study resulted in six 
recommendations, all of which were enacted. The recommendations included focusing on performance 
violations that most affect reliable service (modified assessment parameters), having team-building 
sessions among city officials and contractor officials, and having assessments for violations approved by 
the public works director and assistant public works director for at least a year (restored responsibility 
to transit). 
Contractor Performance 
Monitor Contractor’s Performance and Conform to Procurement Rules 
A contractor allegedly made late payments to vendors, including employee insurance and utility 
companies, failed to report accidents on time, and conducted improper drug testing procedures. The 
transit agency terminated the transit service contract in February 2013 due to performance. The 
terminated contractor protested the new bid award for violation of procurement code and state open 
meeting laws. The district court ordered a stay in the litigation so the transit agency and contractor 
could enter mediation mandated by their contract. Attempts to restore an agency-run system failed to 
pass, and the agency awarded a contract to the new successful bidder in July 2013. 
Monitor Contractor’s Performance for Improved Customer Service and Compliance with Service 
Standards 
In spring 2011, a city council, acting in its capacity as the mass transit board, directed staff to research 
various options for contracting services. The council partnered with Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) 
to analyze options and make a recommendation for the scope of services to be included in the RFP. The 
three options included transit management for fixed route, transit management for fixed route and 
paratransit, and a transit service contract for paratransit. Proposals were evaluated by a team 
comprising staff from the City Manager’s office, Human Resources, Comptroller, General Services, 
Aviation, TTI, the agency, and the Office of Management and Budget. The process was observed by a 
City representative, who was a member of the Citizen’s Advisory Committee and Human Resources 
staff. The City awarded a transit management contract for fixed route service, and will continue to 
maintain oversight over fixed route services to ensure that customer service improves, and ongoing 
compliance with service standards are met at the highest levels. 
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Contract Modification for Performance Using Contractual Authority and In-house Cost Analysis 
In May 2011, a transit authority issued a cure notice to a contractor for customer complaints and 
in-service on-time performance (ISOTP). After the initial cure notice, authority staff identified additional 
deficiencies that resulted in a material breach of contract. In January 2012, an extension of the original 
cure notice was sent to the contractor, and the authority exercised its right to partially terminate the 
contract for a specific bus line for cause in May 2012, and exercised its contractual authority to 
permanently transfer the line from the current contractor to another contractor that was already 
operating adjacent lines. Authority staff considered bringing the services in-house for the remaining 
three years of the contract period; however, based on the authority’s marginal cost of $102 per revenue 
service hour, the cost to operate the line in-house was projected at $10 million compared to the 
contractor’s cost of $7.3 million. Under existing contract modification authority, the other contractor’s 
contract was modified to include operation of the specific line through December 2012. This contract 
modification extended the contractor’s operation of the line through December 2015 and added funds 
to the contract for the contract period. 
Internal Audit of Contractor Compliance 
An internal audit at a transit agency was conducted in 2011 to review the execution and monitoring of 
the contractor’s fixed route purchased services contract. The audit focused on operational areas 
identified as having the greatest probability for needing improvement. The audit objective was to 
determine whether the contractor was in compliance with contract terms, and focused on the following: 
 Are contract terms being fulfilled by the contractor? 
 Does the contractor’s performance align with contract specifications? 
 Does the agency provide sufficient oversight and monitoring to ensure that assets are properly 
maintained by the contractor? 
 Does the contract management plan help ensure effective and timely oversight of the 
contractor’s performance? 
 Are contract payments, including associated incentives and penalties, accurately calculated 
and paid? 
The audit recommended fixes for all areas, specifically for ensuring effective and timely oversight of the 
contractor’s performance. The agency was required, by August 2012, to develop a standardized contract 
management plan (CMP) template that will be expanded and refined for all individual contracts.  
Unrealized Savings 
A contractor allegedly promised $10 million in annual savings by taking over operations of a transit 
agency. The agency spent $39.5 million in 2011 on bus services, down from $42.1 million in 2010, a $2.6 
million decrease. The agency saved more money—$1.5 million (of the $2.6 million)—by cutting bus 
service (14,000 fewer service hours). Cost savings accounted for about $1.1 million of the $2.6 million. 
The agency’s expenses rose from $132.3 to $132.8 million, in part due to $1.4 million in increased 
administration costs on the part of the contractor. Promised savings of $10 million annually were 
unrealized. 
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Contractor’s Safety Performance 
There was an allegation at a transit agency in 2010 that private operators running buses side-by-side 
with publicly operated buses had a worse safety record. The authority reported 0.8 preventable 
accidents per 100,000 miles, while the three contractors’ preventable accidents per 100,000 miles 
ranged from 1.4 to 1.9. A May 2013 report indicated that the agency had a major decrease in bus 
accidents in 2012. The agency reported that new attention to detail and refresher courses were 
responsible for the 24 percent decrease in accidents in 2012 as compared to 2011.  
Transition to Public Management 
Return to Public Management for Cost Savings 
In 2011, after five years, a transit agency did not renew its contract with its current contractor, which 
served as manager of the entire system. The agency chose to bring the transit system back under public 
management, and indicated that it will save more than $50,000 a year by returning to agency transit 
administration. 
Return to Public Management for Direct Accountability 
In 2008, the general manager of a transit authority said that greater direct accountability for customer 
service was a primary reason he recommended that the board neither renew the agency’s contract with 
the current contractor, nor hire any of three other contractors who bid to take over the paratransit 
service when the current contract expired. Instead, the transit agency decided to take over the service 
itself, even though the transit authority faced potential conflict with the labor union representing 
workers, because it was reluctant to hire all of the contractor’s employees. 
Transition to Public Management for Direct Control over Management Staff and Costs 
The Management Services Subcommittee of the board of a transit authority recommended an 
immediate transition to in-house management and revision of the scope of the Management Services 
Agreement (MSA) with the current contractor, which had held the contract for 13 years. The 
subcommittee identified the following advantages in moving management from a contract to an 
in-house function: 
 Direct control over management staff, including hiring and retention 
 Direct information and control over management costs and resulting cost savings 
 Elimination of potential disruptions caused by external corporate reorganizations 
 Elimination of potential tensions between external corporate goals and agency goals 
The board unanimously approved the contract amendment effective July 2013, a year prior to the 
contract end date. The authority anticipates savings of $1.0-2.5 million per year. For the first time since 
its formation 25 years ago, the authority will have in-house employees. 
Transition to Public Management for Flexibility in Service Quality and Cost 
In 2013, after 32 years of contracting for bus drivers externally, a transit agency decided to bring the 
service in-house. A report from city administration revealed that removing the contractor would provide 
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the greatest flexibility in service quality and cost factors. The contract with the service provider expired 
in December 2012 and had been renewed on a month-to-month basis since then. With cash saved from 
the transition to in-house, the department was able to hire a Transit Planning and Service Design 
Coordinator, an Operations Manager, and a Coordinator for Operator Development and Recruitment. 
The director said, “More hands on, and we’ll be able to directly incorporate the city’s culture and vision 
to operators better.” 
Transition to Public Management for Progressive Leadership of the Regional System’s Needs 
In November 2000, voters established a transit district along with a transit sales tax. In 2007, another 
transit agency (established in 1992) was annexed into the district, governed by a board of trustees 
appointed by the city councils. Service had been contracted for nearly 17 years. On May 29, 2009, after 
months of research, the board of trustees voted unanimously to take contracted services in-house, 
effective August 2009. By taking operations and maintenance in-house, the board said it was better 
positioned to accomplish its vision of providing progressive leadership for the region’s transportation 
needs. The move allows the district to enhance the integration of management and operations, and to 
streamline the organization so that performance and services to valued riders continue to improve. 
Three key factors that motivated management to support ending the contract included the following: 
1. Having more direct control over the work environment 
2. The change in the contracting industry, where previously several contractors competed for the 
district’s business, now only three large competitors remained, which had purchased the smaller 
companies; this lack of competition led to less focus on the district’s goals and more focus on 
corporate goals 
3. The district’s ability to attract personnel with the experience necessary to operate services 
directly 
Using Unification to Enhance Cost-Effectiveness and Efficiency 
Unified Operations 
The board of directors of a transit authority approved an action to authorize the CEO to execute a 
contract with a contractor for fixed route bus operations and maintenance. The action unified bus 
operations in two cities under a single contract, with the authority directly managing bus operations in 
the region. Management staffing was streamlined. Economies of scale were realized for purchasing, 
training, and administrative functions, and equated to lower operating costs as routes were reassigned 
between the two cities’ facilities. A joint scope of work was developed for the contractor bidding 
process and proposal evaluations. The decision to award was based on the following, and represents a 
shift from separate operations to a single contractor. 
1. Price 
2. Integrated operations plan 
3. Management team and firm experience 
4. Continuous improvement 
5. Employee development 
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Over a 10-year period, the price proposal for the unified approach was $36 million less than the 
combined costs to operate each entity separately. A four-day strike in August 2013 was ended after the 
contractor agreed to eliminate from the bus drivers’ union contract a clause that would have allowed 
the contractor to fire employees at will, without giving them an opportunity to appeal the decision. 
Consideration of Unified Operations 
Two neighboring counties are considering handing off operations of their transit systems to one private 
contract. Commissioners told staff to research the idea and create an interlocal agreement for 
commissioners to review. The counties would still own their own buses and stops, but who hires the 
drivers, performs daily maintenance, and plans routes could change. Taking a regional approach to 
transportation could position the counties to receive more federal funding. The counties already 
collaborate on transportation through a program that allows riders to connect between the agencies’ 
systems without a transfer fee. The counties also operate a couple of joint routes. In August 2013, both 
counties indicated they are considering an interlocal agreement to operate the bus system as one.  
Cost Savings from a Single Agreement 
A new transit agency officially assumed control over another system in 2011, seven months after it was 
formed. Contracts for bus service were consolidated in July 2011 under a single agreement with the 
contractor (the contract with the other system ended June 30, 2011). Bus operations were moved to a 
single base, and the consolidation was expected to save $1 million over operating systems 
independently in the first year alone. 
Regional Service Meets Service Needs 
Since December 2012, the contractor for a regional transit authority leveraged the locations of two 
facilities, as opposed to using a more standard, single facility to minimize deadhead. The contractor said 
the situation is unique because of the demand to commute between two cities, instead of a city center 
and its suburbs. 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) Benefits to an Agency 
In May 2013, a city council report proposed adoption of a resolution authorizing an IGA with another 
city for the provision of fixed route transit service at a cost of $1,826,021. The city council has 
authorized annual contract change orders to multi-year IGAs with the city since 1983. The change order 
was the fourth and final amendment to the original five-year IGA, and covered the period from July 1, 
2013, through June 30, 2014. 
The IGA identifies the operation of seven routes, details the city’s fixed route transit service costs, and 
provides a summary of performance from fiscal year (FY) 2010 through projected FY 2014. Funding for 
fixed route transit services comes from the city’s Transportation Privilege Tax, Proposition 400 sales tax, 
and passenger fares. Fixed route transit service costs and a performance summary from FY 2010 through 
FY 2014 (estimated) are detailed in the report attached to the resolution. The report confirms that policy 
implications support City Council Critical Objective C. In terms of community involvement, the IGA 
conforms to the city’s Transportation Master Plan Transit Element, the citizen-adopted General Plan 
Community Mobility Element, and citizen-adopted Proposition 400. 
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The transit service detailed in the agreement is also included in the city’s draft FY 2014 budget under the 
“Transit Contract” line items. Administration of the IGA is part of the transit group’s annual workload 
and requires no additional staffing. The contract cost estimate includes maintenance vehicles and 
operating supplies. The city maintains all bus stops at an estimated annual cost of $65,000. Budgets for 
express and fixed route bus services are addressed each fiscal year, and funds are available for transit 
services. The city benefits from continuous service, regional coordination, and the avoidance of frequent 
procurements. 
Labor Issues 
Compensation, Work Rules, and Agency Control 
Under a specific state law, no government agency can hire union employees. The bus system was 
originally run by an electric and gas company, and drivers and customer-service representatives had 
formed a union. This posed a problem when control of the bus system passed to a transit authority in 
1997. As a condition of receiving federal funds, the authority had to guarantee that workers would keep 
their collective bargaining rights, so the authority called for private transportation companies to bid on a 
contract to run the bus fleet. In January 2012, bus drivers voted to authorize a strike as their union 
entered negotiations with the contractor selected to provide service to the authority. At issue were lack 
of full compensation when called in to attend meetings, inadequate sick-leave days, unsanitary 
conditions, forced overtime, and split shifts. Because the drivers were contractor employees, the 
authority was powerless to avert the strike. American Public Transportation Association (APTA) Vice 
President for Advocacy Art Guzzetti was quoted as saying, “I don’t want to sound like I’m against 
privatization, but there’s no inherent advantage of it. There’s nothing about the private-sector manager 
that makes him a better manager than a public-sector manager … Of course, if the savings are all, say, in 
the labor part, then you say all you’re doing is competing for the lowest wages, and that’s a decision 
that the local community has to make.” 
Wage Rates and Turnover 
In 2004, a transit agency asked its contractor to improve bus operators’ benefits in hopes of keeping 
drivers on the job longer. The contractor paid its top drivers only $14 an hour, and lost 30 of its 56 
drivers in one year, causing massive service delays and maintenance issues. The regional system paid its 
top drivers $21 an hour. 
Work Rules 
Buses returned to service in August 2013 after a compromise ended a four-day strike. The transit 
authority contractor agreed to eliminate from the bus drivers’ contract a clause that would have allowed 
the contractor to fire employees at will, without giving them an opportunity to appeal the decision. 
Wages, Benefits, and Work Rules 
In June 2010, a transit authority awarded a new five-year management and operations contract to a 
contractor. Sticking points detailed in August 2011 labor negotiations between bus drivers and the 
contractor pursuant to the new contract are detailed in Table 6. 
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Table 6 – Proposed Wages, Benefits, and New Work Rules 
Issue Contractor Union 
Vacation 
Gradually eliminate 2 weeks for future 
employees 
Maintain current 5 weeks after 20 
years of service 
Future negotiations 
Discuss company’s responsibilities, 
including pension payments to 
employees after contract ends 
Written documentation now 
Sick leave 
Employees earn ½ day each month and 
eliminate payment after December 31 
for any accrued days; the contractor has 
a cap of 35 days already in effect 
company-wide 
Earn 1 day each month; payment 
for all accrued days for 
employees who retire under old 
system; standard part of their 
contract for the past 20 years 
Health insurance premiums Halve contractor contribution Remain the same  
Wages 
No employee pay raises the first year, a 
½ percent raise the second year, and a 1 
percent increase each year for the 
following 3 years—a 3½ percent 
increase over the next 5 years 
A ½ percent to 1½ percent raise 
for employees in the second and 
third years of a 3-year contract—
potentially a 3 percent raise over 
3 years 
Part-time employees As many as 60 No more than 30 
Contract length 5 years 3 years 
 
Wages, Benefits, and Working Conditions 
A transit agency’s bus drivers worked more than a year without a contract. The union’s issues with the 
county included salaries, insurance, sick days, and working conditions. There was a brief strike by the 
workers in September 2011. In December 2011, the commission voted 3-2 to go against their staff’s 
recommendation by passing up the current contractor in favor of pursuing a contract to manage the 
system with the second company on their list. In May 2012, the local union filed a grievance against the 
new contractor, alleging that the contractor had agreed to provide its part-time bus drivers with dental, 
vision, and life insurance in March. After enrolling those employees for the benefits and providing them 
for a month, the contractor revoked the benefits without notice. In June 2012, the union and the 
contractor resolved a variety of grievances that accused the company of revoking benefits, assigning 
hours, and running holiday bus service without first negotiating with the union or following the labor 
contract. Union leadership asked the county to take over operation of the mass transit system. The 
same request had been made the previous year, when commissioners passed a gas tax in an effort to 
fully fund mass transit. Estimates indicated that it would cost the county an additional $194,000 to 
assume management of the system; however, an operational analysis to determine possible savings 
associated with such a move has not yet been done. 
In September 2013, the local union voted unanimously to allow the executive board of the local union to 
schedule a strike date; the union objects to the 401(k) retirement system and wants to be included in 
the state’s retirement system, along with other county employees. Union members have not received a 
raise since 2008, and no raise is proposed in the new three-year contract. The chairman of the 
commission noted that it was his intent to make sure that transit workers had comparable retirement 
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and healthcare coverage to county workers. The county’s new $0.04 gas tax for transit begins in 
January 2014. 
Compensation, Work Rules, and Agency Control 
In 1991, a transit agency created a subsidiary to manage its union workers, because state law forbade 
public employees from engaging in collective bargaining, but federal law required continuation of 
existing bargaining rights in order to receive federal funds. A new state senate bill required that by 
September 2012, all union employees be transferred in-house, with workers forfeiting their collective 
bargaining and striking rights—or, all work would be contracted out, and employees would have the 
right to negotiate their wages and benefits with their employer. Union workers voted to contract out all 
work in order to retain their bargaining rights. In August 2011, the board of directors voted unanimously 
to keep wages and benefits the same for union workers transitioning to a new employer, but said it 
would not guarantee an equivalent pension plan. Union employees would retain accrued pension 
benefits, but the current pension plan would not transfer to the new private contractor. 
The transit agency approved a new contract for fixed route services beginning in August 2012, and will 
retain the agency’s current 240 administrative employees to manage the agency contracts (five in total). 
In March 2013, the union reached an agreement with the new contractor effective through September 
2015. The agreement contains an immediate 2.1 percent wage hike effective February 17 (first increase 
since 2011) and additional 2.1 percent raises scheduled for October 2013 and 2014; requires a higher 
health care contribution from workers; slows step pay increases for employees hired after August 19—
meaning it will take seven years, instead of five, for new employees to reach the top pay grades; and 
does not include a two-tiered system where workers’ wages are lowered. 
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Recommended Course of Action 
Decision to Contract 
A contracting decision tree is illustrated in below. The decision to contract begins with a cost analysis of 
current operations, including a route level assessment, followed by cost-efficiency strategy development 
that incorporates input from peer agencies. After considering the agency’s operating environment, an 
agency is prepared to make the contracting decision. 
The critical first step in the decision-making process is a detailed cost analysis of the current operation, 
which includes projected revenue by source—fare box revenue and revenue from other sources; 
projected expenditures by type—labor, non-labor, and other post-employment benefits; available 
subsidies by source—dedicated taxes, state and local subsidies; and a comparison of current metrics to 
peer transit authorities and peer systems that contract service—revenue, expenses, local contribution, 
subsidy-to-revenue ratio, operating and maintenance costs per revenue hour/mile, and NTD 
performance metrics. 
 
Figure 1 – Contracting Decision Tree 
If an agency elects not to contract service, several strategies may help to improve service in-house. An 
agency can work to change labor agreements related to work rules and compensation. Changes such as 
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split shift, interlining, and part-time labor provide managers with more flexibility and reduce costs. 
Adjusting vehicle routes and scheduling to reduce non-revenue service, and using efficient vehicles 
appropriately sized for low ridership routes, enhance system effectiveness and reduce costs (Iseki, Ford, 
and Factor 2006). 
If an agency elects to contract service, elements contracted to achieve agency goals must be identified. 
An agency can consider providing guidelines or setting minimum compensation levels for private sector 
employees (Iseki, Ford, and Factor 2006); examine private contractors’ part-time employee policies and 
the compensation package structure; and develop measures to evaluate contractor performance and 
service quality, and arrange to monitor the measures (TRB 2001). An agency can cultivate a competitive 
bidding environment to reduce the possibility of one contractor monopolizing service provision 
(McCullough, Taylor, and Wachs 1998). 
Procurement – Competitive Process 
An RFP is a competitive procurement method that considers the following: 
1. A proposal’s management team 
2. Approach to service delivery—competitive procedure based on more than cost 
3. Past performance 
4. Pricing 
5. Contractor and key staff reference checks—scrutinize contractors beforehand 
The goal of the procurement process is electing a contractor who can be relied upon to provide quality 
service at a reasonable price. The most common procurement method is competition through an RFP, 
where the transit agency solicits offers for the service to be provided. Some agencies that use 
contracting use each of the following methods: (a) orders under pre-existing contracts; (b) sole source or 
preferred vendors; (c) exercising a contract option (use a provision in an existing contract to extend the 
term of that contract); and (d) selection from a list of preferred vendors (Arndt and Cherrington 2007). 
Agencies that use contracting said they had at least three offers in response to their most recent 
solicitations for each mode operated, except when obtaining offers for the operation of their commuter 
rail services (GAO-13-782).  
In selecting a contractor, transit agencies may be required to consider potential conflicts of interest. 
Agencies that use contracting have an ethics policy or standards in place that prohibit conflicts of 
interest, and they consider federal law, regulations, and guidance prohibiting conflicts of interest for 
contractor employees and businesses when contracting out (GAO-13-782). 
Contract Document 
Contract content is critical to ensuring the procurement process leads to the selection of a qualified, 
quality contractor. The contract should include the following elements: 
1. Outline specific duties/responsibilities for contractor and agency 
2. Thorough description of services to be provided 
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3. Specify wage rates/cost escalation  
4. Support agency will provide 
5. Minimum qualifications and experience of the company and key staff 
6. Minimum acceptable qualifications for contractor employees (drivers) 
7. Established and well-defined service quality performance measures—on-time performance, 
safety performance, maintenance reliability, and customer satisfaction 
8. Established method and frequency of performance measurement 
9. Incentive and disincentive clauses tied to performance measures and/or other aspects of 
contractor’s performance (reducing driver turnover) 
10. Teamwork/communication with contractor 
11. Maintain a cooperative relationship with union 
12. Monitor contract performance 
13. Process for handling change—amount of service, fuel, changes to key contract staff 
(Arndt and Cherrington 2007) 
Duration of Contract 
Contract duration impacts the level of competition and quality of service. Potential contractors lose 
interest in short contract periods due to the cost and effort required to develop a proposal and to start 
up a new service. Agencies fear long-term contracts produce contractor complacency (Arndt and 
Cherrington 2007). 
While many agencies perceive competition in the bidding process because they receive a large number 
of initial bids, the long length of existing contracts (on average 5.5 years) and the unequal competition in 
the bidding process (a few dominant vendors) indicate that adequate competition and innovation is an 
unlikely result of the current process (Arndt and Cherrington 2007). The most common contract term is 
a five-year initial contract period, sometimes including the option to extend into additional years 
(GAO-13-782). 
Agency Provision of Equipment – Vehicles 
The transit industry has moved toward providing vehicles and the maintenance facility to the contractor. 
Primary benefits of the agency providing vehicles include the agency having access to the fleet, which 
they can operate or re-contract for service in the event of unsatisfactory contractor performance; a bus 
life of 12 years exceeding most contract periods, forcing the contractor to advance the rate of 
depreciation as a cost; opening competition to a wider variety of companies since the contractor must 
be financially able to incur significant debt in the procurement of vehicles; and an agency can take 
advantage of federal and state grants for procurement (Arndt and Cherrington 2007). 
Contract Compensation 
Once a transit agency makes the decision to contract and selects a contractor, the two parties enter into 
a contract. Among other things, the contract specifies compensation, which may be structured in a 
variety of ways, including fixed-price compensation, cost-plus compensation, and performance 
incentives and/or penalties. Fixed-price compensation is based on a set price, with several payment 
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options. Payment may be a fixed amount per month. Compensation might also be hourly, meaning the 
contractor pay is based on the number of hours that service is provided, either the number of hours the 
transit service collects fares or from the time that vehicles leave the facility until they return. Finally, the 
contractor can be compensated on a per-trip or per-mile basis, wherein the transit agency pays based 
on the number of trips provided or miles travelled. Under a cost-plus compensation arrangement, the 
transit agency reimburses the contractor for all direct transit agency costs, and pays the contractor a fee 
in the form a flat rate per period of time or a percentage of total direct costs. 
The GAO study lists various ways that transit agencies structure compensation in their contracts, 
including fixed price, price per revenue service based on hours or miles, price per vehicle miles or hours, 
and number of passenger trips provided. 
Managing Contract Services 
Contract services require a level of oversight not unlike directly operated services. Balancing 
collaboration and oversight is a hallmark of successful contracting. Arndt and Cherrington (2007) suggest 
the transit agency be prepared to do the following: 
 Dedicate some level of staff to manage the service 
 Measure performance 
 Document service issues 
 Monitor maintenance records 
 Monitor contractor’s safety and training initiatives 
 Periodically review accident reports 
 Affirm that contractor employees meet contractual standards, where applicable  
 Maintain open and amicable communication with contractor to facilitate service 
improvements, if needed 
In the GAO study, transit agencies reported undertaking a variety of activities to assess the quality of 
contracted services. The most commonly used methods included the following: 
 Periodic reports or meetings 
 On-site inspections 
 Use of performance metrics  
 Real-time monitoring 
A number of agencies that contract services also reported in the study having a specific unit or 
department to conduct oversight. Transit agency officials interviewed described how they use various 
methods, arrangements, and metrics to oversee contractor performance, as listed below: 
 Officials that use contractors oversee performance through activities such as routinely 
communicating with their contractors, either through periodic meetings or as needed; 
inspecting contractors’ facilities or vehicles; and/or using real-time monitoring devices 
installed on vehicles. 
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 Agencies use in-house and third-party contractors to monitor the contractor’s performance 
staff for more high-level oversight and management. 
 Agencies that contract some or all of their transit services use metrics to establish 
performance incentives and/or penalties in contracts. Some agencies do not include 
performance incentives in their contracts because they expect the contractor to perform at 
a high level of service; however, they do have penalties for certain violations, such as 
accidents.  
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Appendix A – Contract Review 
Type of Contract Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & Operations 
of Public Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Contractor Independent contractor Independent contractor Independent contractor Independent contractor Independent contractor 
Contract Term 3 years 5 years 3 years 5 years 5 years 
Renewal/ 
Extensions 
2 one-year upon mutual 
consent of parties, subject 
to city council’s approval 
Option to renew 
automatically upon (1) 
contractor meeting 
performance criteria, and 
(2) contractor’s significant 
investment in the transit 
system, or by mutual 
consent  
No reference to renewal or 
extension 
5-year renewal at County’s 
discretion 
2-year extension upon 
mutual consent of parties 
Services Fixed route operations, 
administrative and 
maintenance-related 
functions 
Manage all transit system 
functional responsibilities, 
operations, and 
maintenance 
Manage and operate Manage and operate Manage, operate, and 
maintain 
Revenue Vehicles City provides after joint 
inspection 
Agency delegates to 
contractor after joint 
inspection 
Agency provides after joint 
inspection 
County licensed contractor 
to use County-owned 
transit system property  
County provides 
Non-revenue 
Vehicles 
 Contractor responsible  Cost to maintain during 
first budget year may not 
exceed $20k 
 
Facilities City provides access to its 
transit and maintenance 
facilities 
Agency delegates to 
contractor 
Agency provides County licensed contractor 
to use all County-owned 
transit system property  
County provides and 
maintains 
Service Plan City provides and reserves 
right to adjust 
Contractor develops 
schedules and routing, 
subject to agency approval 
Agency provides and 
reserves right to adjust to 
meet agency’s needs 
Contractor provides, 
subject to Transit 
Committee approval 
Contractor, but County 
may adjust in writing 
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Type of Contract Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & Operations 
of Public Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Unit Cost Renegotiate if revenue 
hours <90% or >110%  
Agency and contractor 
negotiated fixed fee 
(adjusted annually) and 
variable fee (based on 
platform hour rate), 
pursuant to annual plan 
and budget 
Renegotiate rate if revenue 
hours increase or decrease 
by more than 10% 
County and contractor 
negotiated fixed fee 
(adjusted annually) and 
variable fee (based on 
platform hour rate), 
pursuant to annual plan 
and budget 
Contractor may 
recommend rate 
adjustment to cover 
increases or decreases in 
cost structure 
Cost Increase Annual increase may not 
exceed 3% based on CPI in 
the MSA 
   Contractor may submit 
proposal for increase in the 
case of extraordinary 
events 
Fare Policy City provides and reserves 
right to adjust at City’s sole 
discretion 
Contractor recommends, 
subject to agency approval 
Agency provides and 
reserves right to adjust to 
meet agency needs 
Contractor provides, 
subject to Transit 
Committee approval 
Contractor provides, but 
County may adjust in 
writing 
Hours of Service City provides and reserves 
right to adjust at City’s sole 
discretion 
Contractor recommends, 
subject to agency approval 
Agency provides and 
reserves right to adjust to 
meet agency needs 
Contractor provides, 
subject to Transit 
Committee approval 
Contractor provides, but 
County may adjust in 
writing 
Contract 
Compliance 
Project manager; City 
representatives ride City-
operated vehicles without 
notice 
Authority Board oversight Agency Department of 
Transit Administration 
(Manager) 
County County administrator or 
designated representative 
Equipment 
Condition 
Contractor responsible; City 
issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible; 
agency issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible; 
County specifies minimum 
requirements 
Vehicle 
Maintenance 
City provided until 
renegotiated in July 2010; 
contractor now provides for 
fixed monthly fee 
Contractor provides Contractor provides; 
agency issues specific 
requirements; contractor 
must purchase parts off 
agency accounts with 
suppliers for agency-
owned vehicles 
Contractor must provide 
written maintenance plan 
Contractor provides, but 
County specifies minimum 
requirements 
Fuel City provides Agency provides Agency fuel adjustment 
quarterly 
Contractor provides Contractor provides 
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Type of Contract Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & Operations 
of Public Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Drivers Contractor provides; City 
issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides Contractor provides; 
agency issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides; 
County provides specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides 
Supervisors Contractor provides; City 
issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides Contractor provides; 
agency issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides Contractor provides 
Personnel Contractor provides for all 
classifications 
Contractor provides for all 
classifications 
Contractor provides for all 
classifications 
Contractor provides for all 
classifications 
Contractor provides for all 
classifications; 
employment preference to 
local labor 
Mandatory 
Personnel 
Project manager, mechanic, 
half-time road supervisor, 
general manager 
CEO, CFO, COO, chief 
maintenance officer, 
marketing director, HR 
director, director 
scheduling/planning, 
director of procurement, 
executive consulting 
personnel, technical 
assistance 
Project manager, 
maintenance manager; 
agency issues specific 
requirements 
CEO and COO General manager, subject 
to County approval 
Labor 
Negotiations 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible and 
must notify County of ATU 
employee wage rate 
modifications 
Training Contractor provides; City 
issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides Contractor provides; 
agency issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides Contractor provides 
Fare Collection & 
Reconciliation 
Contractor responsible; 
reports to City monthly 
by day 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible  Contractor responsible for 
collection and 
reconciliation; County 
provides specific 
requirements 
Contractor responsible 
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Type of Contract Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & Operations 
of Public Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Fare Box 
Recovery 
Contractor must satisfy 
Transportation 
Development Act 
requirement that 15% of 
monthly operating cost is 
obtained from fare box 
revenue for fixed route; any 
shortfall in the 15% must be 
paid by the contractor at 
the end of the year 
No liability for revenue 
shortages 
Agency requires 100% 
collection from fare boxes 
Beginning with second 
budget year, if fare box 
revenue falls short of 
annual or exceeds 
projected revenue, 
contractor responsible for 
or receives surplus or 
shortfall up to 5% of 
annual projected fare box 
revenue; contractor may 
renegotiate financial terms 
if shortfall is >10% for 2 
quarters 
Contractor responsible 
Safety & Security Contractor provides; City 
issues specific 
requirements; contractor 
must develop and 
distribute Illness & Injury 
Prevention Plan 
Contractor provides Contractor provides; 
agency issues specific 
requirements; contractor 
to submit plan to increase 
overall traffic at terminal 
to improve transit safety 
and security 
Contractor provides Contractor provides 
Reporting Contractor responsible; City 
issues specific 
requirements for daily, 
weekly, and monthly 
reports 
Contractor reports 
monthly: system 
expenditures, financial 
and operating records 
Contractor responsible; 
agency issues specific 
requirements for monthly 
reports 
Contractor responsible, 
including Performance 
Measures and 
Performance Scorecard 
County identifies monthly 
and annual reporting 
requirements 
FTA/NTD 
Reporting 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible 
Drug-Free 
Workplace 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible 
Software & 
Hardware 
Contractor provides Contractor provides Contractor provides Contractor provides Contractor provides 
Customer 
Information 
Service 
Contractor provides; City 
issues specific 
requirements 
Contractor provides Contractor provides Contractor provides Contractor provides 
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Type of Contract Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & Operations 
of Public Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Complaints Contractor responds; 
maintains log; reports to 
City as specified 
Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor responsible Contractor maintains 
Complaint Tracking 
Database 
Marketing & 
Advertising 
City provides Contractor provides Agency provides Contractor provides Contractor provides 
Operating 
Expenses 
  Contractor pays all 
operating expenses and 
agency will reimburse 
 County responsible for 
payment of all operating 
expenses, but contractor 
must retain necessary 
working capital equal to 
fund at least 60 days of 
operating expenses; 
County will pay on a cash 
reimbursement basis 
Liquidated 
Damages 
Contractor charged each 
time default occurs: $100 
per non-trainee driver’s 
failure to wear an approved 
uniform while on duty; $50 
per trip for driver’s failure 
to announce major 
intersections, transfer 
opportunities, and major 
activities as required by 
ADA; $50 per missed trip 
that was in contractor’s 
control; maximum 
liquidated damages in any 
month must not exceed 
$1,000 
No liquidated damages $100 per day will begin to 
accrue and payable on the 
16
th
 day of each month 
until the manager receives 
monthly reports; $100 per 
day per vehicle assessed 
against monthly invoice for 
vehicles reported as dirty 
for 2 consecutive days, 
inoperable air conditioning 
and heating longer than 
same day of breakdown, 
operating vehicles that 
have failed the safety 
inspection; and $5,000 for 
each event of false or 
misleading information 
given to the agency for any 
instance as delineated in 
agreement 
Contractor must pay 
$5,000 for 5 percentage 
points worse than 
benchmark for on-time 
performance; $2,000 for 5 
percentage points worse 
than benchmark for 
percentage of missed 
pullouts; and $5,000 for 
10% worse than the 
benchmark for accidents 
per 100,000 miles 
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Type of Contract Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & Operations 
of Public Transportation 
Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Incentives May earn up to $500 per 
quarter for increased 
ridership of >10% over the 
past 2 quarters average 
    
Performance 
Measures 
Reported monthly by 
contractor: miles between 
road calls; miles between 
maintenance road calls; # 
and % of missed/late pull-
outs; # and % of 
missed/late trips; # and % 
of on-time performance; # 
of complaints/1,000 
passengers; total accidents/ 
100,000 miles; collision 
accidents/100,000 miles; 
ridership by day, mode, 
route, and fare type; total 
preventable accidents/ 
100,000 miles; passenger 
accidents/100,000 miles; 
pass sales activity at 
dispatch office; wheelchair 
boardings; drug & alcohol 
tests; driver/dispatcher 
training activities; driver 
evaluations; and request 
for service not currently 
provided 
Invest in in-house 
technical resources for 
development/financing of 
creation/expansion of rail 
systems; strive to improve 
operating performance for 
safety (current 
preventable traffic 
accident frequency: bus 
2.0, streetcar 5.06), 
on-time service (current: 
bus 88%, streetcar 85%); 
and passenger growth 
(current: bus 19 per hour, 
streetcar 37 per hour); 
invest in agency’s 
infrastructure; provide 
services to seek public 
funding at local, state, and 
federal levels; provide a 
national Emergency 
Response Team in the 
event of a natural 
disaster; and seek to 
reduce $151.17 operating 
cost per hour by 25% 
throughout contract term 
(adjusted for inflation) 
Contractor must submit 
implementation plan to 
increase ridership at least 
10% within first year of 
agreement 
Performance Scorecard: 
revenue hours; service 
miles operated; cost per 
mile; revenue per mile; 
cost recovery; % of miles 
@ 100% recovery; calls 
answered ratio; pass-ups; 
on-time %; customer 
satisfaction score; net 
promoter score; missed 
trips; mechanical 
breakdowns per week; and 
accidents per 100,000 
miles. Bus cleanliness, stop 
cleanliness, and on-time 
perception were listed as 
tentative and subject to 
modification or 
replacement. 
Contractor must certify 
quarterly on-time 
performance of at least 
90%; implement Rider 
Technology within 3 
months; establish and 
maintain a GIS layer for all 
routes, stops, benches, and 
shelters within 6 months; 
and implement Escambia 
County TDP within 6 
months; contractor will 
periodically propose 
alternatives for poor-
performing routes, subject 
to County approval 
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Payment Schedule – Fixed Route Bus Service 
Method of 
Payment 
Transit Services Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Management & 
Operations of Public 
Transportation Services 
Agreement 
Delegated Management 
Agreement 
Transit Management 
Monthly Fixed 
Fee 
$14,738 $1,390,732*  $2,319,664 $32,750 
Revenue Hour 
Rate 
$29.47 
 
 
$100.73   
Projected 
Revenue Hours 
5,366  98,150   
Maintenance 
Monthly Fixed 
Fee 
$2,500 
 
 
   
Monthly Variable 
Fee 
 $76.86  $87.12  
Projected 
Platform Hours 
 299,388    
Projected Annual 
Cost 
$365,000  $9,886,650  $393,000+ 
Adjustments  
Monthly fixed fee adjusted 
annually 
Renegotiate revenue hour 
rate if revenue hours 
increase or decrease by 
>10% 
Fixed fee adjusted 
annually; variable fee 
adjusted annually based 
on CPI, special 
circumstances, and 
reasonable profit for 
contractor 
Cash reimbursement of all 
operating expenses 
*Includes fixed route, streetcar rail, and paratransit service. 
 
